My work, as of right now.
My work, as of right now.
This paper examines the macroeconomic conditions under which populist movements arise, embedding populist governance into a neoclassical DSGE framework to formally link populist policies to underlying economic fundamentals. Contrary to prevailing narratives that attribute populism to behavioral distortions or voter irrationality, I show that populist support emerges as an equilibrium response to structural market failures and externalities. By modeling how economic downturns, labor market frictions, and wealth inequality shape voter preferences, I demonstrate that populism is not an aberration from standard economic theory but a predictable outcome of systemic distortions. This work provides a formal foundation for understanding the economic mechanisms behind political realignments and their implications for long-run economic stability.
This paper explores the effects of local media consolidation on voting behavior, focusing on Sinclair Broadcast Group’s acquisition of regional television stations. Using a border-county difference-in-differences approach, I estimate how Sinclair’s entry into local markets influences congressional election outcomes. I find that Sinclair-owned stations exhibit systematically different coverage, emphasizing nationalized narratives over local investigative journalism. Empirical results suggest that Sinclair’s presence increases Republican vote share by up to 12–15% in affected counties over two election cycles, with persistent but attenuated effects in later years. These findings contribute to debates on media power, information asymmetries, and the role of local journalism in shaping democratic participation.
with Andrea Ricciardi
This paper investigates how political distortions affect aggregate economic expectations and market volatility. I construct a dynamic structural model in which political entrenchment alters fiscal and monetary policy credibility, generating uncertainty in firm and household forecasting. Using empirical evidence and a formal macroeconomic framework, I demonstrate that gerrymandering increases policy inconsistency, amplifies risk premia, and distorts investment incentives by introducing systematic uncertainty about future governance. These findings challenge conventional views that political distortions primarily affect redistribution, highlighting their deeper consequences for macroeconomic stability and private sector decision-making.
with Jeongwoo Moon
This paper investigates the differential impact of Social Security disbursements on racial groups with varying mortality rates. Using a dynamic Overlapping Generations (OLG) framework, we explore how public policy structures can inadvertently exacerbate economic inequality through interactions with health-related investment decisions. By modeling mortality differences in a general equilibrium setting, the analysis highlights how inequities in policy design may contribute to persistent disparities in economic outcomes. This approach offers new insights into the unintended distributional effects of taxation and public policy within an unequal society.